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Today, most students of financial management would agree that
the treatment of risk is the main element in financial decision making.
Key current questions involve how risk should be measured, and how the
required return associated with a given risk level is determined. A
large body of literature has developed in an attempt to answer these
questions.
However, risk did not always have such a prominent place.
Prior to 1952 the risk element was usually either assumed away or
treated qualitatively in the financial literature. In 1952 an event occurred
which was to revolutionize the theory of financial management. In a
path-breaking article, an economist by the name of Harry Markowitz [ 17]
suggested a powerful yet simple approach for dealing with risk. In the
two decades since, the modern theory of portfolio management has
evolved.
Portfolio theory deals with the measurement of risk, and the
relationship between risk and return. It is concerned with the impli-ca-
tions for security prices of the portfolio decisions made by investors.
If, for example, all investors select stocks to maximize expected
portfolio return for individually acceptable levels of investment risk,
what relationship would result between required returns and risk?
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One answer to this question has been developed by Professors
Lintner [ 14, 15] and Sharpe [22], called the Capital Asset Pricing Model.
Once such a normative relationship between risk and return is obtained,
it has an obvious application as a benchmark for evaluating the performance
of managed portfolios.
The purpose of this paper is to present a nontechnical introduction
to modern portfolio theory. Our hope is to provide a wide class of
readers with an understanding of the foundations upon which risk measures
such as "beta", for example, are based. We will present the main
elements of the theory along with the results of some of the more important
empirical tests. We are not attempting to present an exhaustive survey
of the theoretical and empirical literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops measures
of investment return which are used in the study. Section 2 introduces
the concept of portfolio risk. We will suggest, as did H. Harkowitz in
1952, that the standard deviation of portfolio returns be used as a measure
of total portfolio risk. Section 3 deals with the impact of diversification
on portfolio risk. The concepts of systematic and unsystematic risk are
introduced here. Section 4 deals with the contribution of individual
securities to portfolio risk. The nondiversifiable or systematic risk of a
portfolio is shown to be a weighted average of the systematic risk of its
component securities. Section 5 discusses procedures for measuring
the systematic risk or "beta" factors for securities and portfolios.
Section 6 presents an intuitive justification of the capital asset pricing
model. This model provides a normative relationship between security
risk and expected return. Section 7 presents a review of empirical
tests of the model. The purpose of these tests is to see how well the
-2-
model explains the relationship between risk and return that exists in
the securities market. Finally, Section 8 discusses how we can use the
capital asset pricing model to measure the performance of institutional
investors.
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1. INVESTMENT RETURN
Measuring historical rates of return is a relatively straight-
forward matter. The return on our investor's portfolio during some
interval is equal to the capital gains plus any distributions received on
the portfolio. It is important that distributions, such as dividends, be
included, else the measure of return to the investor is deficient. The
return on the investor' s portfolio, designated Rp, is given by
D + AV
R = p P (1)R p
Vp
where
· -~ D = dividends received
P
A V =change in portfolio value during the
interval (Capital Gains)
V market value of the portfolio at thep
beginning of the period
The formula assumes no capital inflows during the measurement period.
Otherwise the calculation would have to be modified to reflect the
increased investment base. Further, the calculation assumes that any
distributions occur at the end of the period, or that distributions are
held in the form of cash until period end. If the distributions were
invested prior to the end of the interval, the calculation would have to
be modified to consider gains or losses on the amount reinvested.
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Thus, given the beginning and ending portfolio values and distri-
butions received, we can measure the investor 's return using
Equation (1). For example, if the investor's portfolio had a market
value of $100 at the beginning of June, produced $10 of dividends, and
had an end-of-month value of $95, the return for the month would be
0. 05 or 5%.
To measure the average return over a series of measurement
intervals, two calculations are commonly used: the "arithmetic average"
and the "geometric average" returns. We will describe each below. To
illustrate the calculations, consider a portfolio with successive annual
returns of -0. 084, 0.040, and 0. 143. Designate these returns as R 1, R 2 ,
and R 3.
The arithmetic return measures the average portfolio return
realized during successive 1-year periods. It is simply any unweighted
average of the three annual returns; that is, (R1 + R 2 + R 3 ) / 3. The
value for the portfolio is 3.3 percent per year.
The geometric average measures the compounded rate of growth
of the portfolio over the 3-year period. The average is obtained by taking
a "geometric" average of the three annual returns; that is,
{[(1+ R)(1 + R 2 ) (1+ 3 )] 1/- 1.0 . The resulting growth rate for
the portfolio is 2.9% per annum compounded annually, for a total 3-year
return of 8.9%3.
The geometric average measures the true rate of return while
the arithmetic average is simply an average of successive period returns.
The distinction can perhaps be made clear by an example. Consider an
asset which is purchased for $100 at the beginning of year 1. Suppose the
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assets price rises to $200 at the end of the first year and then falls
back to $100 by the end of the second year. The arithmetic average
rate of return is the average of +100% and -50%, or +25%. But an asset
purchased for $100 and having a value of $100 two years later did not '
earn 25%; it clearly earned a zero return. The arithmetic average of
successive one-period returns is obviously not equal to the true rate of
return. The true rate of return is given by the geometric mean return
defined above; that is, [(2.0) (0.5)] -1.0 = 0.
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to both types of
averages.
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2. PORTFOLIO RISK
The definition of investment risk leads us into much less well
explored territory. Not everyone agrees on how to define risk, let alone
measure it. Nevertheless, there are some attributes of risk which are
reasonably well accepted.
If an investor holds a portfolio of treasury bonds, he faces no
uncertainty about monetary outcome. The value of the portfolio at
maturity of the notes will be identical with the predicted value. The
investor has borne no risk. However, if he has a portfolio composed
of common stocks, it will be impossible to exactly predict the value of
the portfolio as of any future date. The best he can do is to make a
best guess or most likely estimate, qualified by statements about the
range and likelihood of other values. In this case, the investor has
borne risk.
A measure of risk is the extent to which the future
portfolio values are likely to diverge from the expected or predicted
value. More specifically, risk for most investors is related to the
chance that future portfolio values will be less than expected. Thus,
if the investor 's portfolio has a current value of $100, 000, at an
expected value of $110, 000 at the end of the next year, he will be
concerned about the probability of achieving values less than $110, 000.
Before proceeding to the quantification of risk, it is convenient
to shift our attention from the terminal value of the portfolio to the
portfolio rate of return, Rp. Since the increase in portfolio value isp
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directly related to Rp, this transformation results in no substantive
difference. However, it is convenient for later analysis.
A particularly useful way to quantify the uncertainty about the
portfolio return is to specify the probability associated with each of the
possible future returns. Assume, for example, that an investor has
identified five possible outcomes for his portfolio return during the
next year. Associated with each return is a subjectively determined
probability, or relative chance of occurrence. The five possible
outcomes are:
Possible 1Return Subjective Probability
50% o 0.1
30% 0.2
i0% 0.4
-10% 0.2
-30% 0. 1
1.00
Note that the probabilities sum to 1 so that the actual portfolio return is
confined to take one of the five possible values. Given this probability
distribution, we can measure the expected return and risk for the port-
folio.
The expected return is simply the weighted average of possible
outcomes, where the weights are the relative chances of occurrence.
The expected return on the portfolio is 10%, given by
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E(Rp) = 2 Pj R
j=1
= 0.1(50.0) + 0.2(30.0) + 0.4(10.0)
+ 0.2 (-10.0) + 0.2(-30.0)
(2)
where the R.'s are the possible returns and the Pj's the associated
probabilities. (The expected terminal market value of the portfolio is
equal to M 0 (1 + .10), where M0 is the initial value.)
If risk is defined as the chance of loss or achieving returns less
than expected, it would seem to be logical to measure risk by the
dispersion of the possible returns. below the expected value. However,
risk measures based on below-the-mean variability are difficult to work
with, and furthermore are unnecessary as long as the distribution of
future return is reasonably symmetric about its expected values.
Figure 1 shows three probability distributions: the first symmetric,
the second skewed to the left, and the third skewed to the right. The
symmetrical distribution has no skewness. The dispersion of returns on
one side of the expected return is a mirror image of the dispersion on
the other side of the expected return.
Empirical studies of realized rates of return on diversified port-
volios show that skewness is not a significant problem. If the shapes of
historical distributions are indicative of the shapes of future distributions,
then it makes little difference whether we measure variability of returns
on one or both sides of the expected return. Measures of the total
variability of return will be twice as large as measures of the portfolio's
variability below the expected return if its probability distribution is
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symmetric. Thus, if total variability is used as a risk surrogate, the
risk rankings for a group of portfolios will be the same as when varia-
bility below the expected return is used. It is for this reason that total
variability of returns has been so widely used as a surrogate for risk.
It now remains to develop a specific measure of total variability
of returns. The measures which are most commonly used are the
variance and standard deviation of returns. Measuring risk by standard
deviation and variance is equivalent to defining risk as total variability
of returns about the expected return, or simply, variability of returns.
The variance of return is a weighted sum of the deviations from
the expected return. The variance, designated p for the portfolio in
the previous example is given by
5
P
0.1(50.0- 10.0)2 + 0.2(30.0- 10.0)2
+ 0.4(10.0- 10.0) .2 + 0.2(-10.0- 10.0)2
+ 0.1(-30.0- 10.0)2
- 484 percent squared (3)
The standard deviation is defined as the square root of the variance. It is
equal to 22%. The larger the variance or standard deviation, the greater the
possible dispersion of future realized values around the expected value,
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and the larger the investor's uncertainty. As a rule of thumb, it is often
suggested 'that two-thirds of the possible returns on a portfolio will be
within one standard deviation of return either side of the expected value;
ninety-five percent will lie with plus or minus two standard deviations
of the expected return.
Figure 2 shows the historical return distributions for a diversified
portfolio. The portfolio is composed'of approximately 100 securities,
with each security having equal weight. The month-by-month returns
cover the period from January 1945 to June 1970. Note that the distri-
bution is approximately symmetric, but not exactly. The arithmetic
average return for the 306-month period is 0.91%0 per month. The
standard deviation about this average is 4.45% per month.
Figure 3 gives the same data for a single security, National
Department Stores. The arithmetic average return is 0.81% per month
over the 306-month period. The most interesting aspect, however, is
the standard deviation of month-by-month returns -- 9.02% per month,
more than double that for the diversified portfolio. This result will be
discussed. further in the next section.
Thus far our discussion of portfolio risk has been confined to a
single-period investment horizon such as the next year.. That is, the
portfolio is held unchanged and evaluated at the end of the year. An
obvious question relates to the effect of holding the portfolio for several
periods, such as the next 20 years: will the 1-year risks tend to cancel
out over time? Given the random walk nature of security prices, the
answer to this question is no. If the risk level (standard deviation) is
maintained during each year, the portfolio risk for longer horizons will
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increase with the horizon length. The standard deviation of possible
terminal portfolio values after N years is equal to ;N times the
standard deviation after 1 year. Thus, the investor cannot rely on the
"long run" to reduce his risk of loss.
A final remark before leaving portfolio risk measures. We have
implicitly assumed that investors are risk averse, i.e., they seek to
minimize risk for a given level of return. This assumption appears to
be valid for most investors in most situations. The entire theory of
portfolio selection and capital asset pricing. is based on the belief that
investors on the average are risk averse.
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3. DIVERSIFICATION
When the distribution of historical returns for the 100-stock
portfolio (Figure 2) is compared with the distribution for National Depart-
ment Stores (Figure 3), a curious relationship is discovered. While the
standard deviation of returns for the security is doublt that of the port-
folio, its average return is less. Is the market so imperfect that over
a long period of time (25 years) it rewarded substantially higher risk with
lower average return?
No so. Much of the total risk (standard deviation of return) of
National Department Stores is diversifiable. That is, when combined
with other securities, a portion of the variation of its returns is smoothed
or cancelled by complementary variation in the other securities. Since
much of the total risk could be eliminated simply by holding the stock in
a portfolio, there was no economic requirement for the return earned to
be in line with the total risk. Instead, we should expect realized returns
to be related to that portion of security risk which cannot be eliminated
by portfolio combination (more on risk-return relationships later). The
same portfolio diversification effect accounts for the low standard deviation
of return for the 100-stock portfolio. In fact, the portfolio standard
deviation is less than that of the-typical security in the portfolio. Much of
the total risk of the component securities has been eliminated by diversifi-
cation.
Diversification results from combining securities which have less
than perfect correlation (dependence) among their returns in order to
reduce portfolio risk without sacrificing portfolio return. In general, the
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lower the correlation among security returns, the greater the impact of
diversification. This is true regardless of how risky the securities of
the portfolio when considered in isolation.
Ideally, if we could find sufficient securities with uncorrelated
returns, we could completely eliminate portfolio risk. However, this
situation is not typical of real securities markets in which securities'
returns are positively correlated to a considerable degree. Thus, while
portfolio risk can be substantially reduced by diversification, it cannot be
entirely eliminated. This can be demonstrated very clearly by measuring
the standard deviations of randomly selected portfolios containing various
numbers of securities.
In a study of the impact of portfolio diversification on risk, Wagner
and Lau [24] divided a sample of 200 NYSE stocks into six subgroups
based on the Standard and Poors Stock Quality Ratings as of June 1960.
The highest quality ratings (A+) formed the first group, the second highest
ratings (A) the next group, and so on. Randomly selected portfolios were
then formed from each of the subgroups, containing from 1 to 20 securities.
The month-by-month portfolio returns for the 10-year period through
May 1970 were then computed for each portfolio (portfolio composition
remaining unchanged). The exercise was repeated ten times to reduce
the dependence on single samples. The values for the ten trials were
then averaged.
Table 1 shows the average return and standard deviation for port-
folios from the first subgroup (A+ quality stocks). The average return is
unrelated to the number of issues in the portfolio. On the other hand, the
standard deviation of return declines as the number of holdings increases.
On the average, approximately 40% of the single security risk is eliminated
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by forming randomly selected portfolios of 20 stocks. However, it is
also evident that additional diversification yields rapidly diminishing
reduction in risk. The improvement is slight when the number of
securities held is increased beyond, say, 10. Figure 4 shows the results
for all six quality groups. The figure shows the rapid decline in total
portfolio risk as the -portfolios are expanded from 1 to 10
stocks.
Returning to Table 1, we note from the second last column in the table
that the return on a diversified portfolio "follows the market" very closely
The degree of association is measured by the correlation (R) of each
portfolio with an unweighted index of all NYSE stocks. The 20-security
portfolio has a correlation of 0.89 with the market (perfect positive
correlation results in a correlation of 1.0). The implication is thithe risk
remaining in the 20-stock portfolio is predominantly a reflection of
uncertainty about the performance of the stock market in general.
Figure 5 shows the results for the six quality groups. Correlation in
Figure 5 is given by the correlation coefficient squared, designated R
(possible values range from 0 to 1.0).
The R-squared coefficient has a useful interpretation. It measures
the proportion of variation in portfolio return which is attributable to
variation in market returns. The remaining variation is risk which is
unique to the portfolio and, as we saw in Figure 4, can be eliminated by
proper diversification of the portfolio. Thus, R measures the degree
of portfolio diversification. A poorly diversified portfolio will have a small
R-squared (0.30 - 0.40). A well diversified portfolio will have a much
higher R squared (0.85 - 0.95). A perfectly diversified portfolio will have
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an R-squared of 1.0; that is, all of the portfolio risk is a reflection of
market risk. Figure 5 shows the rapid gain in diversification as the
portfolio is expanded from one security to two securities and up to ten
securities. Beyond ten securities the gains tend to be smaller. Note
that the highest quality A+ issues tend to be less efficient at achieving
diversification for a given number of issues. Apparently the companies
which comprise this group are more homogeneous than the companies
grouped under the other quality codes.
The results show that some risks can be eliminated via diversifi-
cation, others cannot. Thus we are led to the distinction between a port-
folio's unsystematic risk, which can be eliminated by diversification, and
its systematic risk which cannot. The situation is depicted in Figure 6.
The figure shows total portfolio risk declining with increasing numbers of
holdings. The total risk of the portfolio is made up to two parts:
systematic or nondiversifiable risk and unsystematic risk. Unsystematic
risk is gradually eliminated with increased numbers of holdings until
portfolio risk is entirely systematic, i.e., market related. The systematic
risk is due to the fact that the return on nearly every security depends to
some degree on the overall performance of the stock market. Investors
are thus exposed to "market uncertainty" no matter how many stocks
they hold. Consequently, the return on diversified portfolios is highly
correlated with the market.
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4. THE RISK OF INDIVIDUAL SECURITIES
Let 's summarize the message of the previous section. Portfolio
risk can be divided into two parts: systematic and unsystematic risk.
Unsystematic risk can be eliminated by portfolio diversification,
systematic risk cannot. When unsystematic risk has been completely
eliminated, portfolio return is perfectly correlated with the market.
Portfolio risk is then merely a reflection of the uncertainty about the
performance of the market.
The systematic risk of a portfolio is made up from the systematic
risks of its component securities. The systematic risk of an individual
security is that portion of its total risk (standard deviation of return)
which cannot be eliminated by placing it in a well-diversified portfolio.
We now need a way of quantifying the systematic risk of a security and
evaluating the systematic risk of a portfolio from its component
securities.
The nature of security risk can be better understood by dividing
security return into two parts: one dependent (i.e., perfectly correlated),
and a second independent (i.e., uncorrelated) of market return. The
first component of return is usually referred to as "systematic", the
second as "unsystematic" return. Thus,
Security Return Systematic Return
+ Unsystematic Return
(4)
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Since the systematic return is perfectly correlated with the
market return, it can be expressed as a factor, designated beta (JI),
times the market return, R m . The "beta" factor is a "market sensi-
tivity index", indicating how sensitive the security return is to changes
in the market level. The unsystematic return, which is independent of
market returns, is usually represented by a factor epsilon (E). Thus,
the return on a security, R, may be expressed as
R = ORm + E (5)
For example, if a security had a factor of 2.0 (e.g., an airline
stock), then a 10% market return would generate a systematic return for
the stock of 20%. The security return for the period would be the 20%
plus the unsystematic component. The unsystematic return depends on
factors unique to the company, such as labor difficulties, higher-than-
expected sales, etc.
The security returns model given by Equation (5) is usually written
in a way such that the average value of the residual term, E, is zero.
This is accomplished by adding a factor, alpha (), to the model to
represent the average value of the unsystematic returns over time. That
is,
R = a+ R m + (6)
where the average E over time is equal to zero.
The model for security returns given by Equation (6) is usually
referred to as the "market model". Graphically, the model can be
depicted as a line fitted to a plot of security returns against rates of
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return on the market index. This is shown in Figure 7 for a hypothetical
security.
The beta factor can be thought of as the slope of the line. It gives
the expected increase in security return for a 1% increase in market
return. In Figure 7, the security has a beta of 1.0. Thus, a 10% market
return will result, on the average, in a 10% gain in security price. The
market weighted average beta for all stocks is 1.0 by definition.
The alpha factor is represented by the intercept of the line on the
vertical security return axis. It is equal to the average value overtime
of the unsystematic returns on the stock. For most stocks, the alpha
factor tends to be small and unstable.
Using the definition of security return given by the market model,
the specification of systematic and unsystematic risk is straightforward --
10/
they are simply the standard deviations of the two return components.
The systematic risk of a security is equal to times the standard
deviation of the market return.
Systematic Risk = /(rm (7)
The unsystematic risk equals the standard deviation of the residual
return factor E.
Unsystematic Risk = rE (8)
Given measures of security systematic risk, we can now compute
the systematic risk of a portfolio. It is equal to the beta factor for the
portfolio, p, times the risk of the market index, m'
Portfolio Systematic Risk = p m (9)
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The portfolio beta factor in turn can be shown to be simply an
average of the individual security betas, weighted by the proportion of each
security in the portfolio, or
N
(10)p = Xj j (10)j=1
where
X = the proportion of portfolio market value
represented by security j
N = the number of securities
Thus, the systematic risk of the portfolio is simply a weighted
average of the systematic risk of the individual securities. If the portfolio
is composed of an equal dollar investment in each stock (as was the case
for the 100-security portfolio of Figure 2), the p is simply an unweighted
average of the component security betas.
The unsystematic risk of the portfolio is also a function of the
unsystematic security risks, but the form is more complete. With
increasing diversification, this risk can be eliminated
With these results for portfolio risk, it is useful to return to
Figure 4. The figure shows the decline in portfolio risk with increasing
diversification for each of the six quality groups. However, the portfolio
standard deviations for each of the six groups are approaching different
limits. We should expect these limits to differ because the average
risks () of the groups differ.
Table 2 shows a comparison of the standard deviations for the
20-stock portfolios with the predicted lower limits based on average
security systematic risks. The lower limit is equal to the average beta
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for the quality group ( times the standard deviation of the market
return (a m ) . The standard deviations in all cases are close to the
predicted values. These results support the contention that portfolio
systematic risk equals the average systematic risks of the component
securities.
Before moving on, let 's summarize the results of this section.
First, as seen from Figure 4, roughly 40 to 50%0 of total security risk
can be eliminated by diversification. Second, the remaining systematic
risk is equal to the security times market risk. Thirdly, portfolio
systematic risk is a weighted average of security systematic risks.
The implications of these results are substantial. First, we would
expect realized rates of return over substantial periods of time to be
related to the systematic as opposed to total risk of securities. Since
the unsystematic risk is relatively easily eliminated, we should not expect
the market to pay a "risk premium" for bearing it.
Second, since security systematic risk is equal to the security
beta times m (which is common to all securities), beta can be
considered as a relative risk measure. The gives the systematic risk
of a security (or portfolio) relative to the risk of the market index. It is
more convenient to speak of systematic risk in terms of the beta factor,
rather than beta times am.
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5. MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY
AND PORTFOLIO BETA VALUES
The basic data for estimating betas are past rates of return earned
over a series of relatively short intervals -- usually days, weeks, or
months. For example, in Tables 3 and 4 we present calculations based
on month-by-month rates of returns for the periods January 1945 to
June 1970 (security betas) and January 1960 to December 1971 (mutual
fund betas). The returns are calculated in the manner described in
Section 1 (see Equation (1)).
It is customary to convert the observed rates of returns to
"risk premiums". Risk premiums are obtained by subtracting the rates
of return that could have been achieved by investing in short-maturity
risk-free assets, such as treasury bills or prime commercial paper.
This removes a source of "noise" from the data. The noise stems from
the fact that observed returns may be higher in some years simply
because risk-free rates of interest are higher. Thus, an observed rate
of return of 8% might be regarded as satisfactory if it occurred in 1960,
but as a relatively low rate of return when interest rates were at all-time
highes in 1969. Rates of return expressed as risk premiums will be
12/
denoted by small r 's.
Beta for a security is calculated by fitting a straight line to the plot
of observed returns r versus observed returns on the market, denoted by
rm. The equation of the fitted line is
r = a + r m + (11)m
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where is the intercept of the fitted line and represents the stock's
systematic risk. The term represents variation about the line
resulting from the unsystematic component of return. We have put hats ()
over the C0, i and E terms to indicate that these are estimated values. It is
important to remember that these estimated values may differ substantially
from the true values because of statistical measurement difficulties.
However, the extent of possible error can be measured, and we can indicate
a range within which the true value is almost certain to lie.
Figure 8 shows a rate-of-return plot and fitted line for National
Department Stores. The market is represented by a market weighted
index of all NYSE securities. The plot is based on monthly data during
the period January 1945 to June 1970.
The estimated beta is 1.26 indicating above-average systematic
risk. The estimated alpha is -0. 05% per month, indicating that the non-
market-related component of return averaged -0. 60% per year over the
25-year period. The correlation coefficient is 0. 52; thus, 27% of the
variance of security returns resulted from market movements. The
remainder was due to factors unique to the company.
Our interpretation of the estimated alpha and beta values must
be conditioned by the degree of possible statistical measurement error.
The measurement error is estimated by "standard error" coefficients
associated with alpha and beta.
For example, the standard error of beta is 0.12. Thus, the proba-
bility is about 66% that the true beta will lie between 1.26 + 0. 12, and
about 95% between 1.26 ± 0.24 (i.e., plus or minus two times the
standard error). Thus, we can say with high confidence that National
-23-
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Department Stores has above-average systematic risk (the average
stock has beta = 1.0).
The standard error for alpha is 0.45, which is large compared
with the estimated value of -0. 05. Thus, we cannot conclude that the
true alpha is different from zero, since zero lies well within the range
of estimated alpha plus or minus one standard error (i.e., -0.05 + 0.45).
The process of line fitting used to estimate the coefficients is called
"Regression Analysis". Table 4 presents the same type of regression
13/
results for a random collection of 30 NYSE stocks. The table contains the
following items. Column (1) gives the number of monthly observations,
columns (2) and (3) the estimated alpha (a) and its standard error, columns
(4) and (5) the estimated beta () and its standard error, column (6) the
unsystematic risk (r (designated SE R in table), column (7) the R -squared
in percentage terms, columns (8) and (9) the arithmetic average of monthly
riak premiums () and the standard deviation, column (10) the geometric
mean risk premium (g). The results are ranked in terms of descending
values of estimated beta. The table includes summary results for the NYSE
market index and the prime commercial paper "risk-free rate". The
last two rows of the table give average values and standard deviations for
the sample. The average beta, for example, is 1. 05, slightly higher than
the average of all NYSE stocks. The average alpha is 0.13% per month,
indicating a slightly positive average unsystematic return.
The beta value for a portfolio can be estimated in two ways. One
method is to computer the beta of all portfolio holdings and weight the
results by portfolio representation. This method has the disadvantage of
requiring beta calculations for each individual portfolio asset. The second
-24-
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method is to use the same computation procedures used for stocks, but
applied to the portfolio returns. In this way we can obtain estimates of
portfolio betas without explicit consideration of the portfolio securities.
We have used this approach to compute portfolio and mutual fund beta
values.
Figure 9 shows the plot of the monthly returns on the 100-stock
portfolio against the NYSE index for the same 1945 - 1970 period. As in
the case of National Department Stores, the best-fit line has been put
through the points using regression analysis. The slope of the line (j)
is equal to 1.10, with a standard error of 0. 03. Note the substantial
reduction in the standard error term compared to the security examples.
The estimated alpha is 0.14, with a standard error of 0.10. Again, we
cannot conclude that the true alpha is different from zero. Note that the
points group much closer to the line than in the National Department
Store plot. This results, of course, from the fact that much of the
unsystematic risk which causes the points to be scattered around the
regression line in Figure 8 has been eliminated. The reduction is
evidenced by the R-squared measure of 0.87 (versus 0.27 for National
Department Stores). Thus, the market explains more than three times
as much of the return variation of the portfolio than for the stock.
Table 5 gives regression results for a sample of 49 mutual funds.
The calculations are based on monthly returns for the period January 1960
to December 1971. The market is represented by the Standard & Poor's
500 Stock Index. Average values and standard deviations for the 49 funds
in the sample are shown in the last two rows of the table. The average
beta value for the group is 0.92 indicating, on the average, the funds were
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less risky than the market index. Note the relatively low beta values of
the balanced and bond funds, in particular, the keystone B1, B2, and
B4 bond funds. This result is due to the low correlation between bond
and stock returns.
Up to this point we have shown that it is a relatively easy matter
to estimate beta values for stocks, portfolios, and mutual funds. Now,
if the beta values are to be useful for investment decision making, they
must be predictable. That is, beta values based on historical data
should provide considerable information about future beta values if past
measures are to be useful. The question can be asked at three levels.
How predictable are the betas estimated for stocks, portfolios of stocks,
and mutual funds? Fortunately, we have empirical evidence at each
level.
Robert A. Levy [ 13] has conducted tests of the short-run predicta-
bility (also referred to as stationarity) of beta coefficients for securities
and unmanaged portfolios of securities. Levy's results are based on
weekly returns for 500 NYSE stocks for the period December 30, 1960
through December 18, 1970 (520 weeks). Betas were developed for each
security for ten non-overlapping 52-week periods. To measure stationarity,
Levy correlated the 500 security betas from each 52-week period (the historical
historical betas) with the 52-week betas in the following period (the future
betas). Thus, nine correlation studies were performed for the ten
periods.
To compare the stationarity of security and portfolio betas, Levy
constructed portfolios of 5, 10, 25, and 50 securities and repeated the
same correlation analysis for the historical portfolio betas and future beta
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values for the same portfolios in the subsequent period. The portfolios
were constructed by ranking security betas in each period and partitioning
the list into portfolios containing 5, 10, 25, and 50 securities. Each
portfolio contained an equal investment in each security.
The results of Levy s 52-week correlation studies are presented
in Table 5. The average values of the correlation coefficients from
the nine trials were 0.486, 0. 769, 0.853, 0. 939, and 0. 972 for port-
folios of 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 stocks, respectively. Correspondingly,
the average percentages of the variation in future betas explained by
the historical betas are 23.6, 59. 1, 72.8, 88.2, and 94.5.
The results show the beta coefficients to be very predictable
for large portfolios, and of progressively declining predictability for
smaller portfolios and individual securities. These conclusions are
not affected by changes in market performance. Of the nine corre-
lation studies, five covered forecast periods during which the market
performance was the reverse of the preceding period (61-62, 62-63,
65-66, 66-67, and 68-69). Notably, the betas were approximately as
predictable over these five reversal periods as over the remaining
15/
four intervals.
The question of the stability of mutual fund beta values is more
complicated. Even if, as seen above, the betas of large unmanaged port-
folios are very predictable, there is no a priori need for mutual fund
betas to be comparatively stable. Indeed, mutual fund portfolios are
managed, and as such, the betas may change substantially over time
by design. For example, a portfolio manager would tend to reduce the
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risk exposure of his fund prior to an expected market decline and raise
it prior to an expected market upswing. However, the range of possible
values for beta will tend to be restricted, at least in the longer run, by
the fund's investment objective. Thus, while we do not expect the same
standard of predictability as for large unmanaged portfolios, it is of
interest to examine the extent to which fund betas are predictable.
Pogue and Conway [ 20] have conducted preliminary tests for a
sample of 90 mutual funds. The beta values for the period January 1969
through May 1970 were correlated with values from the subsequent period
from June 1970 through October 1971. To test the sensitivity of the
results to changes in the return measurement interval, the betas for each
sub-period were measured for daily, weekly, and monthly returns. The
betas were thus based on very different numbers of observations, namely
357, 74, and 17, respectively. The resulting correlation coefficients
were 0.915, 0.895, and 0.703 for daily, weekly, and monthly betas,
respectively. Correspondingly, the average percentages of variation in
second-period betas explained by first-period values are 84, 81, and 49,
respectively. The results support the contention that historical betas
contain useful information about future values. However, the degree of
predictability depends on the extent to which measurement errors have
been eliminated from beta estimates. In the Pogue-Conway study, the
shift from monthly to daily returns reduced the average standard error
of the estimated beta values from 0. 11 to 0. 03, a 75% reduction. The
more accurate daily estimates resulted in a much higher degree of beta
predictability, the correlation between sub-period betas increasing from
0.703 to 0.915.60.703 to 0.915.
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Figure 10 shows a plot of the Pogue-Conway first-period versus
second-period betas based on daily returns. The figure illustrates the
high degree of correlation between first- and second-period betas.
In summary, we can conclude that estimated security betas are
not highly predictable. Levy's tests indicated that an average on 24% of
the variation in second-period betas is explained by historical values.
The betas of his portfolios, however, were much more predictable, the
degree of predictability increasing with portfolio diversification. The
results of the Pogue and Conway study (among others, see footnote 16)
show that fund betas are not as stable as those for unmanaged portfolios.
On the average, two-thirds to three-quarters of the variation in fund
betas can be explained by historical values.
Further, it should be remembered that a significant portion of
the measured changes in estimated beta values may not be due to changes
in the true values, but rather the result of measurement errors. This
observation is particularly applicable to individual security betas where
the standard errors tend to be large.
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6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EXPECTED RETURN AND RISK
We have now developed two measures of risk and described how
they can be measured from historical data. One is a measure of total
risk (standard deviation), the other a relative index of systematic or
nondiversifiable risk (beta). We have stated our belief that the beta
measure is more relevant for the pricing of securities. Returns
expected by investors should logically be related to systematic as
opposed to total risk. Securities with higher systematic risk should have
higher expected returns.
The question of interest now is the form of the relationship
between risk and return. In this section we describe a relationship
called the "Capital Asset Pricing Model" (CAPM), which is based on
elementary logic and simple economic principles. The basic postulate
underlying the model is that assets with the same risk should have the
same expected rate of return. That is, the prices of assets in the
capital markets should adjust until equivalent risk assets have identical
expected returns. At this point, we say that the market is in an
"equilibrium" condition.
To see the implications of this postulate, consider an investor
18/
who holds a portfolio with the same risk as the market portfolio (beta
equal to 1.0). What return should he expect? Logically, he should
expect the same return as that of the market portfolio.
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Consider another investor who holds a riskless portfolio (beta
equal to zero). The investor in this case should expect to earn the rate
of return on riskless assets such as treasury bills. By taking no risk,
he earns the riskless rate of return.
Now consider the case of an investor who holds a mixture of these
two portfolios. Assume he invests a proportion X of his money in the
risky portfolio and (1 - X) in the riskless portfolio. What risk does he
bear and what return should he expect? The risk of the composite port-
folio is easily computed. Recall that the beta of a portfolio is simply a
weighted average of the component security betas, where the weights are
the portfolio proportions. Thus, the portfolio beta, Bp, is a weighted
average of the market and risk-free rate betas, that is, an average of
zero and one. Thus
p = (1 - X) 0 + X 1
= x (12)
Thus, p is equal to the fraction of his money invested in the risky
portfolio. If 100% or less of the investor 's funds are invested in the
risky portfolio, his portfolio beta will be between zero and 1. 0. If he
borrows at the risk-free rate and invests the proceeds in the risky port-
folio, his portfolio beta will be greater than 1.0.
The expected return of the composite portfolio is also a weighted
average of the expected returns on the two-component portfolios; that is,
E(Rp) = (1 - X) RF + X' E(R ) (13)
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where E(Rp), E(Rm), and R F are the expected returns on the portfolio,
the market index, and the risk-free rate. Now, from Equation (12) we
know that X is equal to p. Substituting into Equation (13), we have
E(Rp) = (1- p) R F + Up E(R m )
RF + fp* (E(R m ) RF) (14)
Equation (14) is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It is
an extremely important theoretical result. It says that the expected return
on a portfolio should exceed the riskless rate of return by an amount which
is proportional to the portfolio beta. That is, the relationship between
return and risk should be linear.
The model is often stated in risk-premium form,
E(rp) = p E(r m ) (15)
where E(rp) and E(rm) are the expected portfolio and market risk
premiums, formed by subtracting the risk-free rate from the rates of
return. In this form the model states that the expected risk premium for
the investor I's portfolio is equal to its beta value times the expected
market risk premium.
We can illustrate the model by assuming that the short-term (risk-
free) interest rate is 6% and the expected return on the market with a
relative risk (beta) of 1.0 is 10%. The expected risk premium for holding
the market portfolio is just the difference between the 10% and the short-
term interest rate of 6%, or 4%. Investors who hold the market portfolio
expect to earn 10%, which is 4% greater than they could earn on a
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short-term market instrument for certain. The expected return on
securities with different levels of risk should be as follows.
Expected Return for Different Levels of Portfolio Beta
Beta Expected Return
0.0 6%
0.5 8%
1.0 1 0%
1.5 12%
2.0 14%
The predictions of the model are inherently sensible. For safe
investments (f = 0), the model predicts that investors would expect to
earn the risk-free rate of interest. For a risky investment ( > 0)
investors would expect a rate of return proportional to the market sensi-
tivity () of the stock. Thus, stocks with lower-than-average market
sensitivities (such as most utilities) would offer expected returns less
than the expected market return. Stocks with above-average values of
beta (such as most airline securities) would offer expected returns in
excess of the market.
In our development of the CAPM we have implicitly made a number
of assumptions which are required if the model is to be established on a
rigorous basis. These assumptions involve investor behavior and condi-
tions in the capital markets. The following is a set of assumptions
which are sufficient to allow a simple derivation of the model.
(a) The market is composed of risk-averse investors who
measure risk in terms of standard deviation of portfolio
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return. This assumption provides a basis for the use of
beta-type risk measures.
(b) All investors have a common ti e horizon for investment
decision making (e.g., 1 month, 1 year, etc.). This
assumption allows us to measure investor expectations
over some common interval, thus making comparisons
meaningful.
(c) All investors are assumed to have the same expectations
about future security returns and risks. Without this
assumption, investors would disagree on expected return
and risks, resulting in a more complex situation.
(d) Capital markets are perfect in the sense that all assets are
completely divisible, there are no transactions costs or
differential taxes, and borrowing and lending rates are
equal to each other and the same for all investors. Without
these conditions, frictional barriers would exist to the
equilibrium conditions on which the model is based.
While these assumptions are sufficient to derive the model, it is not
clear that all are necessary in their current form. It may well be that
several of the assumptions can be substantially relaxed without major change
in the form of the model. A good deal of research is currently being
conducted toward this end.
While the CAPM is indeed simple and elegant, these qualities do not
in themselves make it useful in explaining observed risk-return patterns.
We now proceed to the empirical literature on attempts to verify the model.
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7. TESTS OF THE CAPITAL ASSET
121PRICING MODEL
The major difficulty in testing is that the Capital Asset Pricing
Model is stated in terms of investors ' expectations, not in terms of
realized returns. Obviously, expectations are not always realized after
the fact. From a statistical point of view, this introduces an error term
which should be zero on the average, but not necessarily zero for any
single stock of single period of time. After the fact, we would expect to
observe
Rj = Rf + j(R -Rf) + Ej (16)
where Rj, Rm, and Rf are the realized returns on stock j, the market
index,and the riskless asset; and j is the residual term.
The term Ej reflects the firm's unsystematic risk -- the risk due
to factors unique to the company. Unsystematic risk is eliminated when
the stock is included in a well-diversified portfolio.
Thus, if the hypothesis is correct, and we observe returns for
many stocks and many periods of time, then Ej ought to be zero on the
average, and the observed risk premiums on various stocks ought to be
proportional to the stocks' betas.
This hypothesis is illustrated by Figure 11. Each plotted point
represents one stock's realized return versus the stock's beta.
According to the capital asset pricing model, the line fitted to these
points should be (1) linear and (2) upward sloping. Also, (3) it should
pass through the vertical axis at the risk-free rate.
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The equation of this fitted line is
j = + 77 0 j + Pi (17 a)
where Rj is the average return realized on stock j, j is its estimated
beta, and j is a residual term. The capital asset pricing model predicts
that o, the intercept of the fitted line on the return axis, should have the
value Rf, and that the slope, y 1, should have a value equal to RM - Rf*
where RM and Rf are the averages of the market returns and risk-free
rates of interest during the period studied.
Expressed in risk premium form, the equation of the fitted line is
= 70 + -1 j + pj (17b)
where rj is the average realized risk premium stock j, that is, Rj - Rf.
The only difference is that the predicted value of 70 under the capital
asset pricing model hypothesis is zero.
Other Measures of Risk
The hypothesis just described is only true if beta is a complete
measure of a stock's risk. Various alternative risk measures have been
proposed. The most common alternative hypothesis is that expected
return is related to the standard deviation of return -- that is, to a stock's
total risk, which includes both systematic and unsystematic components.
What is more important in explaining average observed returns on
securities, systematic or unsystematic risk? The way to find out is to
fit an expanded equation to the data:
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Rj = o + 1 j + 2(SE) + j (18)
~A ~ ~ ~hA
Here j is a measure of systematic risk and SE. a measure of unsystem-
20/
atic risk. Of course, if the capital asset pricing model is exactly true,
then 2 will be zero -- that is, SEj will contribute nothing to the explana-
tion of observed security returns.
Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
If the capital asset pricing model is right, the empirical tests
whould show the following:
1. On the average, and over long periods of time, the
securities with high systematic risk should have high
rates of return.
2. On the average, there should be a linear relationship
between systematic risk and return.
3. Unsystematic risk, as measured by SEj, should play
no significant role in explaining differences in
security returns.
These predictions have been tested in several recent statistical studies.
We will review some of the more important of these. Readers wishing
to skip the details may proceed to the summary at the end of this section.
We will begin by summarizing results from studies based on
individual securities. Then we will turn to portfolio results.
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Results for Tests Based on Securities
We will review two studies, one by Professor N. L. Jacob [9],
and a second by Professor M. H. Miller and M. S. Scholes [19].
The Jacob Study
This study deals with the 593 New York Stock Exchange stocks for
which there is complete data from 1946 to 1965. Regression analyses were
performed for the 1946-55 and 1956-65 periods, using both monthly and
annual security returns. The relationship of mean security returns and
beta values is shown in Table 6. The last two columns of the table give
the theoretical values for the coefficients, as predicted by the capital
asset pricing model.
The results sow a significant positive relationship between
realized return and risk during each of the 10-year periods. For example,
in 1956-65 there was a 6.7 percent per year increase in average return
for a one-unit increase in beta. Although the relationships shown in Table 6
are all positive, they are weaker than predicted by the capital asset pricing
model. In each period 1 is less than the theoretical value.
The Miller-Scholes Study
The Miller-Scholes research deals with annual returns for 631 stocks
during the 1954-63 period. The results of three of their tests are reported
in Table 7. The tests are (1) mean return versus beta, (2) mean return
^2
versus unsystematic risk, (SEj) , and (3) mean return versus both beta
and unsystematic risk.
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The results for the first test show a significant positive relationship
between mean return and beta. A one-unit increase in beta is associated
with a 7.1 percent increase in mean return.
The results for the second test do not agree with the capital asset
pricing model' s predictions. That is, high unsystematic risk is apparently
associated with higher realized returns. However, Miller and Scholes
show that this correlation may be largely spurious (i.e., it may be due to
statistical sampling problems). For example, a substantial positive corre-
lation exists between beta and (SEj). Thus, even though unsystematic risk
may be unimportant to the pricing of securities, it will appear to be
significant in tests from which beta has been omitted. This sort of
statistical correlation need not imply a causal link between the variables.
Test number (3) includes both beta and (SEj)2 in the regression
equation. Both are found to be significantly positively related to mean
return. The inclusion of (Sj) has somewhat weakened the relationship
of return and beta, however. A one-unit increase in beta is now associated
with only a 4.2 percent increase in mean return.
The interpretation of these results is again complicated by the strong
A2
positive correlation between beta and (SE.) , and by other sampling
problems. A significant portion of the correlation between mean return
and (SEj) may well be a spurious result. In any case, the results do show
that stocks with high systematic risk tend to have higher rates of return.
Results for Tests Based on Portfolio Returns
The security tests clearly show the significant positive correlation
between return and systematic risk. Tests based directly on securities,
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however, are not the most efficient method of obtaining estimates of the
magnitude of the risk-return tradeoff. Tests based on securities are
inefficient for two reasons.
The first problem is well known to economists. It is called
"errors in variables bias" and results from the fact that beta, the
independent variable in the test, is typically measured with some error.
These errors are random in their effect -- that is, some stocks' betas
are overestimated and some are underestimated. Nevertheless, when
these estimated beta values are used in the test, the measurement errors
tend to attenuate the relationship between mean return and risk.
By carefully grouping the securities into portfolios, much of this
measurement error problem can be eliminated. The errors in individual
stocks ' betas cancel out so that the portfolio beta can be measured with
much greater precision. This in turn means that tests based on portfolio
returns will be more efficient than tests based on security returns.
The second problem relates to the obscuring effect of residual
variation. Realized security returns have a large random component,
which typically accounts for about 70 percent of the variation of return.
(This is the diversifiable or unsystematic risk of the stock.) By grouping
securities into portfolios, we can eliminate much of this "noise", and
thereby get a much clearer view of the relationship between return and
systematic risk.
It should be noted that grouping does not distort the underlying
risk-return relationship. The relationship that exists for individual
securities is exactly the same for portfolios of securities.
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We will review the results from four studies based on portfolios --
two by Professors M. Blume and I. Friend [3] [8], a third by Professors
F. Black, M. Jensen, and M. Scholes [ 1], and a fourth by E. Fama and
J. MacBeth [6].
Blume and Friend's Study
Professors Blume and Friend have conducted two inter-related
risk-return studies. The first examines the relationship between long-run
rates of return and various risk measures. The second is a direct test of
the capital asset pricing model.
In the first study [8], the authors constructed portfolios of NYSE
common stocks at the beginning of three different holding periods. The
periods began at the ends of 1929, 1948, and 1956. All stocks for which
monthly rate-of-return data could be obtained for at least 4 years
preceding the test period were divided into 10 equal portfolios. The
securities were assigned on the basis of their betas during the preceding
4 years -- the 10 percent of securities with the lowest betas to the first
portfolio, the group with the next lowest betas to the second portfolio,
and so on.
After the start of the test periods, the securities were reassigned
annually. That is, each stock's estimated beta was recomputed at the end
of each successive year, the stocks were ranked again on the basis of
their betas, and new portfolios were formed. This procedure kept the
portfolio betas reasonably stable over time.
The performance of these portfolios is summarized in Table 8.
The table gives the arithmetic mean monthly returns and average beta
values for each of the 10 portfolios and for each test period.
___ iCIII_-_-
For the 1929-69 period, the results indicate a strong positive
association between return and beta. For the 1948-69 period, while
higher beta portfolios had higher returns than portfolios with lower betas,
there was little difference in return among portfolios with betas greater
than 1.0. The 1956-69 period results do not show a clear relationship
between beta and return.
On the basis of these and other tests, the authors conclude that
NYSE stocks with above-average risk have higher returns than those with
below-average risk, but that there is little payoff for assuming additional
risk within the group of stocks with above-average betas.
In their second study [3], Blume and Friend used monthly portfolio
returns during the 1955-68 period to test the capital asset pricing model.
Their tests involved fitting the coefficients of Equation (17a) for three
sequential periods: 1955-59, 1960-64, and 1965-68. The authors also
added a factor to the regression equation to test for the linearity of the
22/
risk return relationship.
Blume and Friend conclude that "the comparisons as a whole
suggest that a linear model is a tenable approximation of the empirical
relationship between return and risk for NYSE stocks over the three
231
periods covered.
The values obtained for /0 and 1 are not in line with the capital
asset pricing models predictions, however. In the first two periods, 0
is substantially larger than the theoretical value. In the third period, the
reverse situation exists, with 0 substantially less than predicted. These
results imply that yl, the slope of the fitted line, is less than predicted
in the first two periods and greater in the third.
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Black, Jensen, and Scholes
This study [1] is a careful attempt to reduce measurement errors
that would bias the regression results. For each year from 1931 to 1965,
the authors grouped all NYSE stocks into 10 portfolios. The number of
securities in each portfolio increased over the 35-year period from a low
of 58 securities per portfolio in 1931 to a high of 110 in 1965.
Month-by-month returns for the portfolios were computed from
January 1931 to December 1965. Average portfolio returns and portfolio
betas were computed for the 35-year period and for a variety of sub-
periods.
The results for the complete period are shown in Table 9. The
average monthly portfolio returns and beta values for the 10 portfolios
are plotted in Figure 12.
The results indicate that over the complete 35-year period,
average return increased by approximately 1.08 percent per month (13
percent per year) for a one-unit increase in beta. This is about three-
quarters of the amount predicted by the capital asset pricing model. As
Figure 12 shows, there appears to be little reason to question the
linearity of the relationship over the 35-year period.
Black, Jensen, and Scholes also estimated the risk-return tradeoff
2 5j
for a number of subperiods. The slopes of the regression lines tend in
most periods to understate the theoretical values, but are generally of the
correct sign. Also, the subperiod relationships appear to be linear.
This paper provides substantial support for the hypothesis that
realized returns are a linear function of systematic risk values. Also, it
shows that the relationship is significantly positive over long periods of
time.
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Fama and MacBeth
Fama and MacBeth [ 6] have extended the Black-Jensen-Scholes
tests to include two additional factors. The first is an average of the
/32 for all individual securities in portfolio p, designated 2 The
second is a similar average of the residual standard deviations (SEX) for
A
all stocks in portfolio p, designated SEp·. The first term tests for
nonlinearities in the risk-return relationship, the second for the impact
of residual variation.
The equation of the fitted line for the Fama-MacBeth study is
given by
- _ ^2 A 73SE 
Rp -T O0 +71p + 2/ 3pp SE p + fp p (19)
(19)
where, according to the CAPM, we should expect ' 2 and '3 to have zero
values .
The results of the Fama-MacBeth tests show that while estimated
values of 2 and Y3 are not equal to zero for each interval
examined, their average values tend to be insignificantly different from
zero. Fama and MacBeth also confirm the Black-Jensen-Scholes result
that the realized values of y0 are not equal to Rf, as predicted by the
capital asset pricing model.
Summary of Test Results
We will briefly summarize the major results of the empirical
tests.
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1. The evidence shows a significant positive relstionship
between realized returns and systematic risk. However,
the relationship is not always as strong as predicted by
the capital asset pricing model.
2. The relationship between risk and return appears to be
linear. The studies give no evidence of significant
curvature in the risk-return relationship.
3. Tests which attempt to discriminate between the effects
of systematic and unsystematic risk do not yield
definitive results. Both kinds of risk appear to be
positively related to security returns. However, we
believe that the relationship between return and unsystematic
risk is at least partly spurious -- that is, partly reflecting
statistical problems rather than the true nature of capital
markets.
Obviously, we cannot claim that the capital asset pricing model is
absolutely right. On the other hand, the empirical tests do support the
view that beta is a useful risk measure and that investors in high beta
stocks expect correspondingly high rates of return.
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8. MEASUREMENT OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
The basic concept underlying investment performance measure-
ment follows directly from the risk-return theory. The return on managed
portfolios, such as mutual funds, can be judged relative to the returns on
unmanaged portfolios at the same degree of investment risk. If the
return exceeds the standard, the portfolio manager has performed in a
superior way, and vice versa.
Given this, it remains to selectaa set of "benchmark" portfolios
against which managed portfolio performance can be evaluated. The
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) provides a convenient and familiar
set of portfolios; however, as discussed below, these are not the only
portfolios which could be used. The CAPM benchmark portfolios are
simply combinations of the riskless rate and market index. The return
standard for a managed portfolio with average beta equal to Up is equal
to the risk-free rate plus 3p times the average realized risk premium
on the market. The performance measure, ap, is equal to the difference
in the average returns between the portfolio and the standard; that is,
p p RF + p(RM - RF) (20)
where Rp, RM, and RF are the average returns for the portfolio,
market index, and riskless bond during the test period.
AEstimated values of alphs () and beta ( ) are determinedP P
as discussed in Section 5 by regressing the portfolio risk premiums on
the market risk premiums. Positive values of ap are indications of
superior performance, negative values of inferior performance.
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The interpretation of the estimated alpha,, holwever, ,18nl8s ake
into consideration possible statistical measurement errors. As discussed
in Section 5, the standard error of alpha (SELL) is a measure of the extent
of the possible measurement error. The larger the standard error, the
less certain we can be that the measured alpha is a close approximation
26/
to the true value.
A measure of the degree of statistical significance of the estimated
alpha value is given by the ratio of the estimated alpha to its standard
error. The ratio, designated as t , is given by
oap
tc = p (21)
The t gives a measure of the extent to which the true value of alphs can
be considered to be different from zero. It measures the number of
multiples of standard error that Op is away from zero. If the absolute
value of t is large, then we have more confidence that the true value
of alpha is different from zero. Absolute values of t in excess of 2. 0
indicate a probability of less than about 2. 5% that the true value of alpha
could equal zero.
These methods of performance measurement were originally
devised by Michael Jensen [ 10] [11] and have been widely used in many
studies of investment performance, including that of the recent SEC
Institutional Investor Study [ 20].
However, the tests of the capital asset pricing model summarized
in Section 7 indicate that the average returns over time on securities and
portfolios deviate systematically from the predictions of the rno del
Though the observed average risk-return relationships seem to be linear,
the tradeoff of risk for return is, in general, less than would be predicted
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from the CAPM. In short, the evidence suggests that the CAPM does not
provide the best benchmarks for the average return-risk tradeoffs
available in the market from naively selected portfolios.
These results do not prohibit our attempts to measure performance.
They indicate that benchmark portfolios other than those prescribed by
the CAPM would be more appropriate; but given such alternative naively
selected portfolios, the analysis could proceed in exactly the same manner
as described above. The work of Black, Jensen, and Scholes [ I ] shows
the average return from naively selected portfolios, when plotted against
risk, tends to lie along a straight line with slope somewhat less than
implied by the CAPM. These "empirical risk return" lines would seem to
be a natural alternative to the market line implied by the capital asset
pricing model. Performance would then be measured relative to the
empirical line, as opposed to the market line. A comparison of those two
standards is illustrated in Figure 13. The market line performance
measure (designated as a in Figure 13) is equal to the vertical distance
from the portfolio to the market line. The empirical line measure
(designated a 2 ) is the vertical distance from the portfolio to the empirical
line.
Since the market index ideally is composed of all assets, both
the empirical and market lines would be expected to pass through the
market index coordinates (point O in Figure 13). The intercepts on the
return axis, however, are different. The market line intercept, by
definition, is equal to the risk-free rate. The empirical line intercept
equals the average return on a portfolio with "zero beta", designated R Z .
-48-
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The existence of long-run rates of return on the cT(Io l(et:i portfolih
different from the riskless rate is a clear violation of the predictions of
the CAPM. As of this time, there is no clear theoretical understanding
as to the nature of this difference.
To summarize, empirically based performance standards would
seem to be the natural alternative to those of the capital asset pricing
model. This follows mainly because the empirical standards reflect the
actual performance of naively selected portfolios. However, the design
of appropriate empirical standards requires further research. In the
interim, the familiar market line benchmarks can provide useful informa-
tion regarding relative performance, but care must be exercised to avoid
drawing fine distinctions among portfolio results.
-49-
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our task is finally completed. We have presented a brief but
hopefully comprehensive introduction to the foundations and tests of
modern portfolio theory. Our aim was to provide the reader with a first
view of the subject in hopes that his interest will be whetted for further
27
study.
The major topics dealt with were the specification and measure-
ment of security and portfolio risk, the development of a hypothesis for
the relationship between expected return and risk, and the use of the
resulting model to measure the performance of institutional investors.
We have not provided a set of final answers to questions in these areas
because none currently exist. The theory and empirical evidence are in
a state of rapid evolution, and our knowledge has increased markedly in
the recent past and will surely continue to do so in the future.
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Figure 1
POSSIBLE SHAPES FOR PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
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STANDARD DEVIATION VERSUS
NUMBER OF ISSUES IN PORTFOLIO
STANDARD
DEVIATION
.-,
10 15 20 K
Source: Wagner and Lau [24], Exhibit 1.
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Figure 5
CORRELATION VERSUS NUMBER OF
ISSUES IN PORTFOLIO
R-SQUARE
1 2 3 4 5 10 - 15 20
Source: Wagner and Lau [24], Exhibit 2.
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Figure 6
SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC RISK
Standard
Deviation of
Portfolio
R eturn
Unsystematic or
'Diversifiable Risk
Total Risk
Systematic or
Market-Related
Risk
Number of
Holdings
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Figure 7
THE MARKET MODEL FOR SECURITY RETURNS
Security
Return
*
Beta (3),
the line.
j. = 1.0
* *
*
*
*
*
*
* 
the market sensitivity index, is the slope of
Alpha (a), the average of the residual returns, is the
intercept of the line on the security axis.
Epsilon (), the residual returns, are the perpendicular
distances of the points from the line
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Figure 10
INTERPERIOD BETA COMPARISON:
DAILY DATA FOR 90 MUTUAL FUNDS
Beta --
Second
Period
(June '70 ° .o
to Oct '71)
S .
*.No
Beta -- First Period (Jan '69 to May '70)
Source: Pogue and Conway [21]
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RISK ( j)
Average
Security
Return
RM
x
Theoretical Li
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
ne /
I-/ x
x x
x
x W Fitted Line
x
x x x
x
x xX x
x
x
x
x
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 Security Risk 1j
-62-
I
Figure 12
RESULTS OF BLACK, JENSEN AND SCHOLES STUDY
1931 - 1965
.11-
.10
.03-
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0.0 0. S 1.6
SYSTEMATIC RISK
1.5 2.0
Average monthly returns versus systematic
risk for the 35-year period 1931-1965 for
ten portfolios and the market portfolio.
Source: Black, Jensen, and Scholes [ 1],
Figure 7.
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Figure 13
MEASUREMENT OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE:
MARKET LINE VERSUS EMPIRICAL STANDARD
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 ,p
Symbols: RM
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= Return on Market Index
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Number of Average Std. Deviation Correlation with Market
Securities in Return of Return 2
Portfolio (%/month) (% /month) R R
1 0.88 7.0 0.54 0.29
2 0.69 5.0 0.63 0.40 ,
3 0.74 4.8 0.75 0.56
4 0.65 4.6 0.77 0.59
5 0.71 4.6 0.79 - 0.62
10 0.68 4.2 0.85 0.72
15 0.69 4.0 0.88 0.77
20 0.67 3.9 0.89 0.80
, 
Table 2
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 20-STOCK PORTFOLIOS
AND PREDICTED LOWER LIMITS
(2)
June 1960 - May 1970
(3)
Stock Standard Deviation Average Beta Lower
of 20-Stock Value for Limit 
Qroup Portfolios Quality Group 0 * am
Group%/mo %/mo
A+ 3.94 0. 74 3.51
A 4.17 0.80 3.80
A- 4.52 0.89 4.22
B+ 4.45 0.87 4.13
B 6.27 1.24 5.89
B- & C 6.32 1.23 5.84
* am = 4.75% per month.
m
Source: Wagner and Lau [24], page 6.
(4)
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Table 4
REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR 49 MUTUAL FUNDS
January 1960 - December 1971
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SECURITY
1MCDONNELL FND INCOR
2VALUE LINE SPECIAL S
3 KEYSTO'NE S -t
4CHASE FUND OF BOSTON
5EQUITY PROCRESS
GFIDELITY TREND FUND
7FIDELITY CAPITAL FUN
8KEYSTONE K-2
9OPPENHEIMER FUND
10DELAWARE FUND
11KEYSTONE S-3
12PUTNAH GROCWTH FUND
13SCUDDER SPECIAL FUND
14ENERGY FUND
15ONE WILLIA1M STREET F
16THE DREYFUS FUlND
17t1ASSACHUSETTS INVEST
18WINDSOR FUN!D
19AXE-HOUGTON STOCK FU
2(:&P 500 STOCK INDEX
21T ROWE PRICE GROWTH
22MASSACHUSETTS INVEST
23BUI LnCK FUIJID
24KEYSTnONE S-2
25EATON & HOWARD STOCK
2GTHE COLONIAL FUN!D
27FIDELITY FUND
28INVESTMENT CO OF AHE
29HAMII TON FUJNDS-SERIE
30AFFILIATEI) FUND
31KEYSTONE S-1
32AXE-HOUGHTONl FUND B
33AMERICAN fMtUTUAL FUND
34 PIOIJEER FUI!D
35CHE1ICAL FUND
36STEIN ROW FARNHAM BA
37PURITAN FUND
38THE VALUE LINE INCOM
39THE GEORGE PUTNAM FU
49NCHOR INCOME :
41 LOOMIS-SAYLES MUTUAL
42WELLINGTON FUND
43MASSACHUSETTS FUND
44NATION!WIDE SECURITIE
45 EATON & HOWARD BALAN
46fiA!ERICAN BUSINESS SH
i 7 EYSTONE K-1
4 ! 'EYSTOtNE-B-4
' I Ft EYSTONE-B- 2
5!: EYSTOIt,!E B-I
5130 DAY TREAS. BI.LLS
NOBS ALPH
144.00 0.58
144.00' 0.02
144.00 0.03
144.00 0.11
144.00 -0.54
144.0 0 0.79
144.00 0.41
144.00 0.08
144.00 0.67
144.00 0.18
144.00 0.18
144.00 0.21
144.00 0.39
144.00 0.06
144.00 0.13
144.00 0.17
144 I.00 0.15
144.00 0.18
144.00 0.39
144;.00 0.0
144.00 0.05
144.00 -0.02
144.00 0.09
144.00 0.0;
144.00 -0.05
141 4.00 0.06
144.00 0.15
144.00 0.2F
144.n00 -0.12
144.00 0.08
144.00 0.03
144.00 0.01
144.00 0.20
1144.00 0.24
144.00 0.57
144.00 0.06
144.00 0.19
144.00 0.07
14 4 .0.Q _ Q.07
144.00 -0.03
144.00
144.00
144. 00
144.00
144.00
144.00
144.00
144.00
0.05
-0.12
0.04
-0.32
-0.07
0.12
0.01
0.12
144.00 0.05
144.00 -0.08
144.00 0.0
SE .
0. 40
0.28
0.33
0.41
0.29
0. 24;
0. 2 20.22
0.31
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.28
0.18
0.22
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.30
0.0
0. 11
0.14
0. 19
0.12
0.13
0.19
0.11
0.20
0.23
0.14
0.10
0.20
0.20
0.16
0.25
0.10
0.15
0.17
0.10
0.13
0.10
0.13
0.11
0.15
0.12
0.09
0.11
0.13
0.10
0.10
0.0
BETA
1.50
1.48
1. 43
1.42
1.26
1.23
1.20
1.17
1.16
1.15
1.14
1.13
1.12
1.10
1.06
1.04
1.03
1.03
1.02
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.93
0.89
0.88
0.86
0.85
0.8 I
0.83
0.79
0.78
0.78
0.77
0.74
0.74
0.72
0.72
0.67
0.62
0.53
0.53
0.30 
0.16
0.07
0.0
SE.B SE.R R**2
0.22 9.76 25.18
0.11 4.78 57.62
0.08 3.38 71.77
0.09 3.94 64.78
0.11 4.85 48.89
0.08 3.52 63.39
0.06 2.81 72.17
0.06 2.63 73.90
0.08 3.66 58.86
0.05 2.32 77.62
0.05 2.32 77.50
0.05 2.25 78.19
0.07 3.33 61.93
0.05 2.18 78.39
0.06 2.66 69.33
0.04 1.69 84.40
'0.04 1.96 79.65
0.01 1.95 79.87
0.08 3.62 52.96
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.04 1.72 82.08
0.04 1.72 82.07
0.05 2.32 71.10
0.03 1.45 86.12
0.03 1.52 84.75
0.05 2.27 71.24
0.03 1.31 88.08
0.05 2.4 0 68.79
0.06 2.73 62.55
0.04 1.71 79.31
0.03 1.21 88.18
0.05 2.44 63.68
0.05 2.38 64.35
0.04 1.88 73.85
0.07 3.03 51.50
0.03 1.21 86.05
0.04 1.79 72.89
0.04 2.01 67.96
0.03 1.18 85.75
0.04 .60' 75.24
0.03 1.22
0.03 1.54
0.03 1.26
0.04 1.78
0.03 1. 46
0.02 1.10
0.03 1.32
0.03 1.51
0.03 1.16
0.03 1.21
0.0 0.0
83.96
75.60
82.16
66.45
71.62
76.96
69.59
35.82
22.03
4.43
0.0
ARPJ SD. R
1.13 11.24
0.57 7.32
0.55 C.34
0.63 6.61
-0.08 6.77
1.24 5.80
0.85 5.31
0.51 5.13
1.10 5.69
0.60 4.90
0.60 4.88
0.62 4.80
0.80 5.37
0.4;6 4.67
0.52 4.78
0.55 4.26
0.52 4.34
0.56 4.33
0.76 5.26
0.37 3.76
0.41 4.06
0.34 4.04
0.44 4.29
0.39 3.89
0.30 3.89
0.4/1 4.23
0.50 3.79
0.61 I4.29
0.22 4.44
0. 41 3.74
0.35 3.51
0.32 4.03
0.51 3.97
0.55 3.67
0.88 4.33
0.35 3.22
0.48 3.43
0.36 3.54
0.35 3.12
0.24 3.21
0.32 3.04
0.14 3.11
0.30 2.98
-0.08 3.07
0.16 2.74
0.31 2.28
0.21 2.39
0.23 1.88
0.11 1.31
-0.06 1.23
0.34t 0.12
,I . IEAN SEC. VALUES
.,.STANDARD DEVIATIONfS
144.00 0.12 0.20 0.92 0.05 2.35 68.79
0.0 0.23 -0.12 0.30 0.03 -1.42 17.39
0.46 4.25 0.36
0.28 1.65 0.24
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(1)
CRPJ
0.67,
0.3 
0.35
0. 1
-0.31
1.07 ,
0.71
0.38
0.94
0.48
0.48
0.51
0.66
0.35
0.41
0.46
0.43
0.47
0.62
0.30
0.32
0.26
0.35
0.31
0.23
0.32
0.43
0.51
0.12
0.34
0.29
0.24
0.43
0.48
0.79
0.30
0.42
0.29
0.30
0.19
0.27
0.09
0.26
-0.12
0.12
0.29
0.18
0.21
0.10
-0.07
0.34
_  ___CIII__II__LI____a_____ll--1_ ---
Table 5
CORRELATION OF 52-WEEK BETA FORECASTS WITH
MEASURED VALUES FOR PORTFOLIOS OF N SECURITIES
1962 - 1970
Source: Robert A. Levy [13], Table 2.
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Forecast for Product Moment Correlations : N -
52 Weeks
Ended 1 5 10 25 50
12/28/ 62 .385 .711 .803 .933 .988
12/27/63 .492 .806 .866 .931 .963
12/25/64 .430 .715 .825 .945 .970
12/24/65 .451 .730 .809 .936 .977
12/23/66 .548 .803 .869 .952 .974
12/22/67 .474 .759 .830 .900 .940
12/20/68 .455 .732 .857 .945 .977
12/19/69 .556 .844 .922 .965 .973
12/18/70 .551 .804 .888 .943 .985
Mean dratic .486 .769 .853 .939 .972Mean
Table 6
RESULTS OF JACOB'S STUDY
rj
A
= 0 + 'Yj + Pj
Tests Based on 593 Securities
Return Regression Resultsa Theoretical Values
Interval 2 = Y
'y 0 ' 1 ' 0 1R M- R F
46-55 Monthly 0.80 0.30 0 02 0 1.10
( 0 0 7 )(b)
Yearly 8.9 5.10 0.14 0 14.4
(0.53)
56-65 Monthly 0.70 0.30 0.03 0 0.8
(0.06)
Yearly 6.7 6.7 0.21 0 10.8
(0.53)
(a) Coefficient units are: monthly data, percent per month;
annual data, percent per year.
(b) Standard error.
Source: Jacob [9], Table 3.
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Table 7
RESULTS OF THE MILLER AND SCHOLES STUDY
Rj = 'Y + 1 j + 2 (SEj) 2 + j
Annual Rates of Return 1954-1963
Tests Based on 631 Securities
Regression Res ults (a ) Theoretical Values
, .7 l -2
;_ )'° yY1 Y2 t o Y1 2
12.2 7.1 0.19 2.8 8.5 0
( 0 . 7 ) (0.6)
16.3 39.3 0.28 2.8 8.5 0
(0.4) (2.5)
12.7 4.2 31.0 0.33 2.8 8.5 0
(0.6) (0.6) (2.6)
(a) Units of Coefficients: percent per year.
(b) Standard error.
Source:
Table 1.
Miller and Scholes [ 19],
-72-
Table 8
RESULTS OF FRIEND-BLUME STUDY
Returns from a yearly revision policy for
stocks classified by beta for various periods
Monthly arithmetic mean returns
Source: Friend and Blume [8], Table 4.
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Holding Period
Port- 1929-1969 1948-1969 1956-1969
folio Mean Mean Mean
Number Return Return Return
Beta Beta Beta
1 0.19 0.79 0.45 0.99 0.28 0.95
2 0.49 1.00 0.64 1.01 0.51 0.98
3 0.67 1.10 0.76 1.25 0.66 1.12
4 0.81 1.28 0.85 1.30 0.80 1.18
5 0.92 1.26 0.94 1.35 0.91 1.17
6 1.02 1.34 1.03 1.37 1.03 1.14
7 1.15 1.42 1.12 1.32 1.16 1.10
8 1.29 1.53 1.23 1.33 1.30 1.18
9 1.49 1.55 1.36 1.39 1.48 1.15
10 2.02 1.59 1.67 1.36 1.92 1.10
,,................... _-
 ---^--"-----~111------I-i--
Table 9
RESULTS OF BLACK-JENSEN-SCHOLES STUDY
Rp =0 + 01p + PUp
1931 - 1965
Tests Based on 10 Portfolios
(Averaging 75 Stocks per Portfolio)
Regression Results(a) Theoretical Values
.Y0 R2
'0 )X1 2 /0 = RF '1 = RM - RF
0.519 1.08 0.90 0.16 1.42
(0. 0 5 )(b) (0.05)
(a) Units of Coefficients: percent per month.
(b) Standard error.
Source: Black, Jensen, and Scholes [1],
Table 4 and Figure 7.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Respectively Professor and Associate Professor of Finance,
Sloan School of Management, MIT. This paper was originally
prepared by us as Part I of "A Study of Investment Company
Incentive Fee Arrangements". The research was supported by
a grant from the Investment Company Institute, Washington, D.C.
2. The general expression for the arithmetic mean return for a series
of N periods is given by
- _1 R
R N 2 R t
t=1
where Rt is the investment return during period t, as measured
by Equation (1).
3. The general expression for the geometric or compounded rate of
return over a series of N periods is given by
1/N
= [(1 + R 1) (1 + R 2 ) ... (1 + RN)] - 1
N 1IN
= [ 7 (1 +Rt)] - 1
t=1
The total return for the period is given by (1 + )N - 1.
4. The relationship between the geometric and arithmetic mean
returns is such that the arithmetic mean is always equal to or
greater than the geometric average. The difference increases
as the dispersion of the returns increases. The following
equation developed by Young and Trent [25] shows the nature
of the difference.
R= [G + a 2 (R)]1/2
-75-
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where
R = the arithmetic average return
= the geometric average return
2
a (R) = the variance of the series of returns
Rearranging,
G = [/R2 - 2(R)1/2
This relationship shows that R and G are equal only for an
asset with constant returns. For given R, as (R) increases,
the difference between the means will increase. Thus, R
is a good approximation for G only when the variance of the R t
returns is small.
5. The transformation changes nothing of substance, since
M -T = (1 + Rp) M 0
= M + M 0 Rp
where
MT = terminal portfolio value
Rp = portfolio return
p 
Since MT is a linear function of Rp, any risk measures
developed for the portfolio return will apply equally to the
terminal market value.
6. Risk measures based on below-average-value variation are
analytically difficult to deal with. H. Markowitz, in Chapter 9
of [ 18], develops a semivariance statistic which measures
-76-
variability below the mean and compares it with the more
commonly used variance calculation.
7. See for example M. E. Blume [2].
8. This result follows easily for continuously compounded rates of
return. The return for N periods, Rp, is simply the sum of the
N one-period returns; that is,
Rp R 1 + R 2 + .. + R N
Now, if the one-period returns are independently and identically
2distributed with variance , then the variance of Rp will equal
No , the standard deviation fNa. The key assumption of
independence of portfolio returns over time is realistic, since
security returns appear to follow a random walk through time.
9. Two securities with perfectly correlated return patterns will
have a correlation coefficient of 1.0. Conversely, if the return
patterns are perfectly negative correlated, the correlation
coefficient will equal -1. Two securities with uncorrelated
(i.e., statistically unrelated) returns will have a correlation
coefficient of zero. The average correlation coefficient
between securities on the NYSE is approximately 0.7.
10. The reader may wish to verify that total risk (as measured by
variance) really does equal the sum of systematic and unsystematic
i-4 - risks (also measured by variance). The relationship between the
risk components is given by
-77-
2 2 2 2U =PU + E (5a)
This follows directly from Equation (5) and the assumption of
independence of Rm and E.
The R-squared term previously discussed is the ratio of systematic
to total risk (both measured in terms of variance).
,2 a2
R-squared =
2
Note also that the R-squared is the square of the correlation
coefficient between security and market returns. Thus, the
correlation coefficient is equal to the ratio of 3 am to a.
11. Assuming the unsystematic returns (j) of securities to be uncorre-
lated (reasonably true in practice), the unsystematic portfolio risk
is given by
N
2(p) X 2 2(E
jj=l
2
where (Ej) is the unsystematic risk for stock j. Assume the
portfolio is made up of equal investment in each security and 2 (E)
is the average value of the a (Ej). Then, Xj.= /N and
2( -2 1 2(( Up) N2 · E I (E)
(N2 ()
-78-
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which obviously approaches zero as the number of issues in the
portfolio increases.
12. That is, the risk premium for month t, rt, is given by
rt = R t - RF t
where
R t = security return in month t
RFt = risk-free ree r turn in month t
The conversion to risk premiums results in no substantive change
but is consistent with theoretical developments discussed in
Section 6.
13. The sample was picked to give the broadest possible range of
security beta values. This was accomplished by ranking al NYSE
securities with complete data from 1945-70 by their estimated
beta values during this period. We then selected every twenty-
fivth stock from the ordered list. The data was obtained from the
University of Chicago CRSP (Center for Research in Security
Prices) tape.
14. The commercial paper results in Table 3 are rates of return,
not risk premiums. The risk premiums would equal zero by
definition.
15. Correlation studies of this type tend to produce a conservative
picture of the degree of beta coefficient stationarity. This results
-79-
from the fact that it is not possible to correlate the true beta values
but only estimates which contain varying degrees of measurement
error. Measurement error would reduce the correlation
coefficient even though the underlying beta values were unchanged
from period to period.
16. These results are consistent with those found by N. Mains in a
later and more extensive study [ 16]. Mains correlated adjacent
calendar year betas for a sample of 99 funds for the period 1960
through 1971. The betas were based on weekly returns. The
average correlation coefficient for the 11 tests was 0. 788, with
individual values ranging from a low of 0. 614 to a high of 0. 871.
17. From this point on, "systematic risk" will be referred to simply
as risk. "Total risk" will be referred to as total risk.
18. We use the term portfolio in a general sense, including the case
where the investor holds only one security. Since portfolio return
and (systematic) risk are simply weighted averages of security
values, risk-return relationships which hold for securities must
also be true for portfolios, and vice versa.
19. The material in Section 7 was also prepared as an appendix to
testimony to be delivered before the Federal Communications
Commission by S. C. Myers and G. A. Pogue.
-80-
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20. SEj is an estimate of the standard error of the residual term in
Equation (16). Thus, it is the estimated value for (Ej), the
the unsystematic risk term defined in Equation (8). See column (6)
of Tables 3 and 4 for typical values for securities and mutual funds.
21. For example, skewness in the distributions of stock returns can
lead to spurious correlations between mean return and SEj. See
Miller and Scholes [19] , pp. 66, 71.
22. Their expanded test equation is
Rj 0 + + 72(j
where, according to the capital asset pricing model, the expected
value of 2 is zero.
23. Blume and Friend [3] , p. 16.
24. Table , p. 15, of Blume and Friend [3] presents period-by-period
regression results.
25- Figure 6 of Black, Jensen and Scholes [ 1] shows average monthly
returns versus systematic risk for 17 non-overlapping two-year
periods from 1932 to 1965.
26. See columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 for typical mutual fund and SEa
values.
27. There are a number of excellent references for further study of
portfolio theory. Among these we would recommend books by
Richard A. Brealey [ 4], Jack Clark Francis [ 7] , and William F.
Sharpe [23] . For a more technical survey of the theoretical and
empirical literature, see Jensen [ 12]
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